The E-7 Wedgetail aircraft is an advanced radar station and flying command centre; it will be the eyes in the sky for Britain with an unparalleled ability to track both hostile and friendly aircraft, missiles, and other potentially hostile craft; the problem is that there will be too few, and they’ll arrive too late.
The retirement of the RAF’s seven-strong fleet of E-3 Sentry planes in 2021 marked the end of an era in British air combat capability and the beginning of a transition towards the more advanced, but fewer, E-7 Wedgetail manufactured by Boeing.
However, this transition has been anything but smooth.
The first of three E-7 Wedgetail aircraft was due to be delivered by the end of last year under a £ 1.9 billion contract signed in 2018. However, delivery has been delayed until the second half of 2024. A delay that has raised concerns among MPs and defence analysts alike.
The RAF’s transition to the advanced E-7 Wedgetail aircraft has been significantly hampered by delays attributed to aerospace manufacturer Boeing. Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton’s rather revealing testimony before the Defence Select Committee served to highlight the airborne early warning capability gap foisted upon the British armed forces. Despite concerted efforts to expedite delivery, challenges ranging from Boeing’s internal issues to the complexities of managing subcontractors and certification processes have contributed to a rather unwelcome delay in getting the new aircraft into service. As Knighton confirmed, “Boeing took on a contract to deliver a capability in a timescale that it has been unable to do it in”.
Delays are one of many problems; even when delivered, there will likely be too few aircraft. The decision to trim the E-7 fleet from the initially planned five to just three has sparked concern in the upper echelons of defence, a sentiment echoed by retired Royal Navy officer Dan Stembridge, who highlighted the inadequacy of three aircraft to “deliver effect in two places at once.”
This reduction stretches an already thin force and raises significant questions about the UK’s commitment to maintaining a combat-effective fleet. Recent deliberations in the Defence Committee have further brought to light these concerns as Mark Francois MP underscored the potential vulnerabilities of the RAF’s current setup, asking RAF chief Knighton, “That is simply not enough, is it?”.
The strategic importance of maintaining a robust AEW&C capability has been highlighted by the operational shifts in Russia’s deployments of its A-50 Mainstay airborne early warning aircraft fleet following a recent loss of just one in the Ukraine war. The A-50’s crucial role in Russian operations accentuates the undeniable significance of such assets, even with a fleet much larger than the UK’s planned three aircraft, the Russian armed forces are finding it difficult to coordinate deployments to ‘plug the gaps’. In this context, the RAF’s decision to reduce its fleet seems even more incongruous, especially considering the UK government remains contractually bound to pay for the radars initially ordered for five aircraft.
In the words of Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, “Our ability to see and understand what is happening in the air domain is fundamental to our ability to direct our forces and our assets and protect our country.” This statement resonates now more than ever. If we are committed to building the radars, it is logical and strategically sound to complete the fleet.
As Knighton himself emphasised, “At a future date, in a future review, it is something that I hope we would come back to,” alluding to the RAF’s desire for a more extensive E-7 fleet. As initially suggested, aiming for six or seven aircraft to ensure capabilities in both east and west might be nearer the mark.
The Government’s decision to cut the E-7 fleet makes no strategic sense and is, in my view, penny pinching pure and simple. As Lord Cameron, the Foreign Secretary, recently pointed out, “it is hard to think of a time when there has been so much danger and insecurity and instability in the world”, it is clear that a robust fleet of E-7 Wedgetails is not a luxury but a necessity.
The time for Government to act is now. They must take a long-sighted approach to defence planning, ensuring that the RAF remains a formidable force, fully equipped to protect the UK and its allies in an increasingly unpredictable global landscape. Cutting the Wedgetail fleet is a strategic miscalculation that must be rectified for national and international security.
